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Abstract  
This paper discusses tools which can be used to 
identify key organisational factors which 
contribute to aviation accidents. The research 
uses a thoroughly-investigated helicopter 
accident as a case study, to determine the extent 
to which analytical and visualisation tools could 
be used to assess maintenance organisational 
issues which contributed to an accident. 
1  Introduction  
High levels of technological development in 
aviation make it particularly difficult to analyse 
aircraft accidents in which there is extensive 
structural damage. Even when technological 
issues are resolved, the complex management 
systems used to maintain safety then need to be 
analysed to identify the factors which 
contributed to the accident.  Unfortunately, 
history shows that it is often easier to focus on 
technological causes rather than other 
deficiencies at an organisational level, such as 
training and maintenance, the work environment 
and the often complex cultural issues which can 
influence behaviour.  These deficiencies can be 
difficult to identify and analyse, particularly 
when the investigation reveals a myriad of 
causal factors.  Nevertheless, the purpose of the 
investigation is to prevent recurrence of the 
accident, and it is therefore essential to identify 
the underlying causal factors of an accident. The 
benefits are obvious - providing a basis for 
improvement in efficiency and overall safety, 
and maintaining public confidence in aviation. 
This paper includes a discussion of the 
tools available for identifying and visualising 
the organisational factors that contribute to 
aviation accidents.  It uses a major helicopter 
accident as a case study to assess some of these 
tools, and to determine which tools would assist 
with achieving organisational improvement to 
prevent recurrence. 
2  Case Study 
In April, 2005, a Royal Australian Navy Sea 
King helicopter N16-100 call sign ‘SHARK 02’ 
crashed on the island of Nias, Indonesia during 
an ADF humanitarian aid mission after a major 
earthquake (Figure 1). Nine Royal Australian 
Navy and Royal Australian Air Force members 
were fatally injured and two were seriously 
injured in the accident.  
 
Figure 1: RAN Sea King Accident Site, Nias [1] 
The key event immediately before, and leading 
to, the accident was identified as disconnection 
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of a control linkage due to incomplete 
maintenance some two months before the 
accident, but the Board of Inquiry [1] found that 
the root cause went far beyond a simple 
maintenance error. Amongst the Findings were 
many causal events including serious 
organisational as well as engineering 
deficiencies. The report also made a large 
number (approx. 250) of recommendations with 
the aim of improving the overall management 
system for the fleet.  
The helicopter crashed on approach to landing, 
where witnesses observed that it suddenly 
adopted a pitch-down attitude; the aircraft 
impacted the ground in a steep nose-down 
attitude. This is illustrated schematically in 
Figure 2 [1] which shows some of the stages of 
the accident, leading to Shark 02 crashing on the 
soccer field of the Tuindrao village. 
The mechanical cause was separation of a 
critical control system linkage, when a bolt 
slipped out of a linkage. The bolt and nut should 
have been secured by a split pin, which was 
missing or ineffective. 
The crash was reported extensively in the 
media, and while the ‘primary cause of the 
accident was the failure of mechanical linkages, 
there were also contributory causes including: 
 Deficiencies in maintenance practices in 
both the Sea King detachment and the 
Squadron;  
 Errors made by the Naval command and 
management systems; and  
 Deficiencies in the levels of support 
provided by Navy and the Defence 
organisation's safety, airworthiness, training 
and logistics management systems.’ [2] 
Furthermore, it was reported that there was a 
‘damning report’ written before the RAN Sea 
King accident, stating that the Squadron had 
insufficient staff and assets and was headed for 
‘an accident’ [3]. Adding to this, the BOI report 
[1] highlighted ‘a complex interaction of 
individual and systemic failings across the 
Australian Defence Organisation’, and [4] that 
‘senior commanders and managers did not fully 
understand their responsibilities for 
airworthiness.’ These issues, inter alia, give an 
indication of the nature of the causal factors 
identified in the investigation, and were 
explored further in this research. 
3  Models 
3.1  Background 
The modern models of accident causation take a 
systems approach, where accidents can be 
attributed to a combination of active operator-
level errors [5]. This change highlights the fact 
that there are some limitations associated with 
older models, i.e. too many restrictions on 
identifying causes as technological rather than 
considering the socio-economic climate 
It is also widely recognised that there are both 
individual and organisational factors that 
contribute to maintenance performance, and 
these factors need to be identified to paint a 
credible, accurate and in-depth picture of the 
causes [6].  
Leveson [7] argued that the problem with a 
“human error” approach is that after an accident, 
it will be ‘easy to find someone involved in the 
dynamic flow of events that has violated a 
formal rule by following established practice 
rather than specified practice’.  She argues that 
the way forward in accident investigations is to 
Figure 2 Accident Sequence of Shark 02 [1] 
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acknowledge human error as a ‘deviation from a 
normal procedure’, however that we should not 
stop there in the investigation; one must devise 
a more effective accident model that would 
require a shifting of focus from explaining 
human error to explaining organisational factors 
that shape this behaviour. This is a very 
important distinction. In support of this view, 
the need for a new model has also been 
suggested [8],  stating that from 1972 to 1985, 
83% of all fatal aeromedical helicopter 
accidents were attributed to “pilot error”, while 
realistically, organisational and operational 
protocols and accepted practices may have 
created an environment, where an accident was 
waiting to happen; human error was just the 
catalyst of an accident sequence, laid down by a 
foundation of organisational deficiencies. 
In summary, accident causation needs to be 
viewed as a complex process involving the 
entire socio-technical system, including 
legislators, government agencies, industry 
associations and insurance companies, company 
management, technical and engineering 
personnel, operations etc.  
In the following sections, two models available 
for organizational analysis – the Reason model 
[9] and Rasmussen’s AcciMap [10] will be 
described and their capabilities discussed.  Both 
were applied to the case study, to allow a 
comparison, and to identify the extent the 
strengths and weaknesses which both might 
contribute if used in future accident 
investigations. 
3.2  Reason Model 
The James Reason Model is widely used and 
accepted; it was developed for analysing a wide 
range of organisational accidents. In his book 
Managing the Risks of Organizational 
Accidents, [11] Reason developed his 
previously published [9, 12] causation analysis 
and created a user friendly model that may be 
adapted to almost any workplace organisation. It 
bases itself on a diagrammatic representation of 
a system’s defences, and highlights deficiencies 
in these defences that may lead to an accident 
[9].  
Sometimes referred to as the Swiss Cheese 
Model, shown in Figure 3, the Reason Model 
represents deficiencies in a system’s defences 
by holes in slices looking like Swiss cheese. 
When the holes line up in consecutive slices, an 
accident trajectory becomes possible. Reason 
[9] notes that ‘these windows of opportunity are 
rare because of the multiplicity of defences and 
the mobility of holes’, although they 
nevertheless are still a possibility. Furthermore, 
Reason adds that ‘since no one can foresee all 
the possible scenarios of disaster, it is therefore 
inevitable that some defensive weaknesses will 
be present from the beginnings of a system’s 
productive life…’ 
 
Figure 3: James Reason's ‘Swiss Cheese’ 
Model [11] 
The model explores two separate approaches to 
human error; the person approach and the 
system approach. Reason highlights that ‘errors 
and violations committed at the sharp end of the 
system – by pilots, air traffic controllers, police 
officers, insurance brokers, financial traders, 
ships’ crews, control room operators, 
maintenance personnel and the like’ are related 
to immediate causes of accidents and if 
prevented, would most likely have broken the 
accident sequence. Until recently, this is where 
an accident investigation would stop, however 
Reason [11]&[12] explores the often neglected 
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differentiation between active failures and latent 
conditions, and explores the notion of latent 
conditions, in which organisations that have 
experienced an accident may look beyond the 
sharp end to identify the causes to avoid a 
reoccurrence. These latent conditions include 
‘poor design, gaps in supervision, undetected 
manufacturing defects or maintenance failures, 
unworkable procedures, clumsy automation, 
shortfalls in training, less than adequate tools 
and equipment’ etc. 
 
Figure 4: Reason Model - The Ideal v The Reality 
[11] 
In an ideal world, according to Reason [11], a 
system’s defences would all be intact, ‘allowing 
no penetration by possible accident trajectories’, 
however as illustrated in Figure 4, in the real 
world, ‘each layer has weaknesses and gaps’ of 
the kind shown in Figure 3.  
More recently, the dynamic state of 
organisational systems has been highlighted - a 
time dimension has been introduced to the 
Reason model; in a review of the circumstances 
underpinning  the crash of a RAF Nimrod 
aircraft [13], Haddon-Cave observed that a 
culture of continual change in a regulatory 
system can have a major impact. He introduced 
this parameter to the Reason model by noting 
that the defence layers may also need to be 
modified to represent the successive changes in 
the system. This approach indeed highlights 
concern that a defence which was appropriate 
and effective at one moment in time might in 
subsequent years be rendered ineffective by 
continual change; in effect, moving the holes 
around opens up the potential for a complete 
accident trajectory.  For the purposes of the 
present study, however, this dimension was not 
included. 
Reason Model - The Defences 
In identifying and exploring the defences of a 
system, it is important to understand the various 
functions they serve and the way in which these 
functions are achieved. Defences are 
mechanisms put into place to counter inevitable 
mistakes from both human interaction and 
technology itself.  
The functions of defence layers are: 
 To create understanding and awareness of 
the local hazards. 
 To give clear guidance on how to operate 
safely. 
 To provide alarms and warnings when 
danger is imminent. 
 To restore the system to a safe state in an 
off-normal situation. 
 To interpose safety barriers between the 
hazards and the potential losses. 
 To contain and eliminate the hazards should 
they escape this barrier. 
 To provide the means of escape and rescue 
should hazard containment fail [11]. 
The ordering of the list above is not random and 
has significance in that the ‘defences-in-depth’ 
concept highlights the proximity of some 
defences to the accident. This concept involves 
successive layers of protection, where each 
defence is guarding against a possible 
breakdown of the one before it; the concept is 
weakened by the dynamics issue raised earlier, 
which allows opportunity for moving defences 
to reduce the reliability of the defences in-depth 
concept. 
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Reason Model Results 
A Reason Model was created for the case study 
accident, using a number of key Findings from 
the BOI report. The key defence mechanisms 
identified as being in place (Figure 5) derived 
from; i) the Military Regulatory System, ii) 
Training, iii) Management Monitoring, iv) 
Standard Operating Procedures, v) 
Communication and vi) Helmet and Restraint.  
 
Figure 5: Key defence mechanisms in Reason 
Model of Sea King Accident 
Although the model above illustrates and 
highlights the accident trajectory that caused the 
accident of N16-100, it fails to provide the 
required depth to identify all of the causal 
factors. Preventing the accident from occurring 
or recurring requires this additional depth to 
identify specific improvements in the existing 
defences or the need for additional defences. An 
interesting observation made during this study, 
and potential weakness, is that the Reason 
Model is constrained to one accident trajectory, 
while it is conceivable that several trajectories 
might come together to contribute to the 
outcome.  
Selecting Defences 
In selecting the defences, the main themes from 
the BOI report were once again identified and 
summarised. The existing defence mechanisms 
put in place by the Squadron, and the Navy 
organisation as a whole were identified and 
categorised. Relevant organisational findings 
were identified, and the defences (and more 
specifically, the deficiencies in them) that were 
selected are listed below. 
Defences Breakdown 
Below is a breakdown of the defences, and more 
specifically their deficiencies or weaknesses that 
represent the “holes” in the Reason Swiss 
Cheese model. The higher level headings refer 
to the key defence mechanisms identified earlier 
in Figure 5. 
1. Military Regulatory Systems 
 Outdated FAR 29 Regulations 
 30 minute change-over procedures 
 No legal obligation to comply with civil 
aviation safety standards 
 
2. Training systems 
 Failure to correctly certify and document 
maintenance procedures 
 Staff not qualified to carry out certain 
maintenance operations 
 No accompanying explanation as to why 
safety procedures exist 
 Ineffective training days, lack of structure, 
planning and follow up testing and 
documentation 
 
3. Management Monitoring 
 Management did not ensure that staff 
carrying out maintenance activities were 
certified to do so 
 Officers who held specific positions were 
often not trained or experienced enough, a 
result of fast tracked promotion to fill gaps 
 Inadequate supervision 
 
4. Tested Standard Operating Procedures 
 Pressure on increased fleet availability and a 
significant lack of resources forced practices 
away from established standard operating 
procedures 
 Failure amongst junior maintenance 
engineers to understand the relevance and 
importance of standard operating procedures 
 
5. Communication systems 
 Breakdown of communication between 
watches 
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 Inadequate communication of audit findings 
and near misses 
 Warnings from engineers largely went 
unheeded 
 
6. Personal Protective Equipment 
 Non-crashworthy seating 
3.3  Rasmussen AcciMap 
Rasmussen developed the AcciMap, a multi-
layered causal diagram that arranges the various 
causes of an accident in terms of their causal 
remoteness from the accident [10]. According to 
the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation [14], who have used the approach, 
the feature that distinguishes this method from 
that of an ordinary accident causation model is 
that it identifies causal factors from all parts of 
the system in which the accident occurred, 
ranging from the physical accident sequence of 
events and activities of the individuals involved, 
right up to the governmental, regulatory and 
social influences.  
 
Figure 6: Potential Structure and Standardised 
Symbols of an AcciMap [10] 
Figure 6 above highlights the skeletal structure 
of the AcciMap, where levels of proximity are 
arranged vertically. The further down the chain 
of events, the closer to the accident sequence 
and final lines of defences. According to 
Svendung & Rasmussen [15] the focus of this 
analysis is the control of the hazardous process 
at the bottom of the socio-technical system, 
therefore a vertical analysis covering all levels 
of influence is necessary as opposed to a 
horizontal, somewhat restricted approach.  
The AcciMap arranges these causal factors in a 
coherent, one page diagram that highlights the 
interrelationships between them, thereby 
highlighting the problem areas within the 
organisation that need to be addressed in order 
to prevent a similar chain of events occurring 
[14]. With this method, a broad situational view 
of the organisational and systemic inadequacies 
that contributed to the accident can be gained 
from essentially one concise, interlinking and 
user friendly map. To further increase clarity, 
any ambiguity of the AcciMap and the nodes 
and arrows can be resolved through a textual 
argument. 
The AcciMap approach has been applied to a 
number of case studies, all but one without 
aviation significance. In particular, it was used 
to highlight causal factors of a major (Esso 
Australia) gas plant explosion [16], and the 
results of that analysis were used to guide the 
development of an AcciMap in the present 
study. 
Selecting Causes/Identifying Factors 
As discussed above, many past accident 
investigations have stopped once the objective 
of attributing blame has been achieved, and 
there is still enormous public pressure to 
attribute blame. In selecting potential nodes 
(issues/causes) for the RAN Sea King accident, 
it was necessary to go beyond such arbitrary 
barriers of causation analysis, to identify not 
only the fact of the missing split pin, and that 
this was due to an error involving a shift 
changeover and inadequate supervision, but why 
personnel were not inadequately supervised and 
why this simple error in communication 
contributed to the event.  
 7  
ASSESSING ORGANISATIONAL 
FACTORS IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS: METHODOLOGIES AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Some of the challenges involved in building the 
model included: 
 Developing a process for identify key causal 
factors from a large and detailed data set - 
the BOI Report. (A key issue is that while 
the Reason model can be built around pre-
identified defence systems, the AcciMap 
structure does not benefit from an initially 
defined structure, and may require 
substantial tailoring), 
 construction and layout of the AcciMap 
(especially interlinking and crossovers), and  
 selecting nodes for inclusion in the model. 
 
Figure 7: AcciMap developed for Sea King accident 
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AcciMap Results 
The AcciMap developed and shown in Figure 7 
explores the causal factors that interlinked to 
cause the fatal accident of Shark 02. The causal 
remoteness increases as you move up the 
vertical axis from the accident. The red boxes 
indicate societal and governmental forces, the 
blue boxes the organisational deficiencies and 
the orange boxes, the physical accident 
sequence.  
4.  Discussion 
One limitation of a study of this kind is that it 
necessarily based its structure on the use of just 
one source, the BOI report. However, that 
source is a well funded, detailed, elaborate and 
non-subjective report that aimed to explore all 
causal factors contributing to the accident. For 
these reasons, this specific case study, due to the 
depth and transparency of the investigation, was 
believed to be suitable for trialling the AcciMap 
method paralleled with the Reason Model. 
Comparison of models 
Throughout the analysis, a comparison was 
made between the AcciMap and the Reason 
models. The two methods provide very different 
outputs, and each may have value for different 
purposes.  Notable features observed include: 
(a) The Reason Model is constrained to one 
accident trajectory. In contrast, the AcciMap 
provides a networked analysis, with multiple 
nodal streams, and therefore is capable of 
offering a better “big-picture” view of the 
overall accident causal issues than does a 
linear sequence model. 
(b) Since the Reason model focuses 
specifically on defences it provides an 
excellent base for identifying and rectifying 
weaknesses in existing defensive measures. 
(c) AcciMap offers the opportunity to identify, 
highlight (and hence modify or improve) a 
somewhat wider range of issues which 
contributed to the accident. 
(d) The identification of AcciMap nodes is to 
some extent subjective, and it is not clear 
how the specifics of the results may be 
influenced by personal experience and 
understanding. Perhaps a more structured 
approach, based on developing a range of 
standard options for nodes, would be of value 
by providing a more robust approach to 
AcciMap generation. Ideally, an effective 
process will be sufficiently robust as to lead 
to identification of an essential causal chain 
and factors. 
Potential for combined application 
This study suggested that there could be benefit 
in using both models in parallel, to take 
advantage of the principal strengths of each. 
More specifically, the strength of the AcciMap 
is that it provides a broad and comprehensive 
picture of the important issue–the nodes–which 
are involved in the accident.  The Reason model 
strength is its focus on defences, and hence on 
potential improvements to the system.  Use of 
the two models together – in a sequence where 
the key nodes identified in the AcciMap could 
then be explored individually using a Reason 
approach – might provide a more robust 
outcome than using the either model alone. 
Figure 8 illustrates this concept by analysing 
Node 12 in the Sea King AcciMap  which was 
shown in Figure 7; the four key defences for 
this particular node are Training, Management 
monitoring, Standard Operating Procedures and 
Communication, and clearly this list provides a 
guide as to where attention could be focussed to 
improve safety and minimise the risk of 
recurrent accidents. 
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Figure 8: Hybrid AcciMap and Reason Model 
Potential for higher-resolution application  
A means of overcoming the limitations of 
performing the analysis as high level, is to 
explore the potential for use of the models 
recursively, i.e. can we re-apply the analysis to 
specific nodes of interest in the AcciMap, to 
access finer detail in the organisational 
structure? In the Reason Model, subdivision of 
defences seems relatively simple, and such 
subdivision should not be difficult.  
Potential for pro-active application 
A major conclusion from this work is that since 
the focus of both models is to identify potential 
weaknesses in a system, there would be 
enormous benefit if the analyses could be 
conducted BEFORE an accident occurs. So how 
could we apply the models pro-actively? A key 
observation in the Sea King accident was that 
there had been a high number of “maintenance 
breakdowns” i.e. events which were noted 
before the accident, and which were intercepted 
before they could lead to an accident.  This 
suggests that these “maintenance breakdowns” 
could be regarded as unfulfilled accidents, and 
application of the AcciMap and Reason models 
to these “maintenance breakdowns” would 
allow the organisation to improve its 
performance and safety levels.  
What form would such a pro-active preventative 
analysis tool take? To be effective, it would 
need to be user-friendly and rapid, and capable 
of interrogating an organisation’s existing 
records – something that should be feasible in a 
well-controlled environment such as the 
aviation industry. Such use of the analysis 
models - as a preventative measure - will be 
explored in further research. One issue is the 
need to better define a process for identification 
of key nodes in the AcciMap, not to produce 
different outcomes and results, but to reduce the 
amount of time and effort an organisation would 
need to put into the construction and 
maintenance of a preventative analytical tool. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study has applied two organisational 
analysis tools to the case study of a major 
helicopter accident.  The results of the processes 
led to several key conclusions: 
The models have different strengths – the 
AcciMap approach provides a better “big-
picture” view of the accident, with multiple 
causal streams.  In contrast, the Reason model 
provides a more focused view of the system’s 
defences and how they were breached to arrive 
at the accident.  
The identification of nodes in the AcciMap 
invites some subjectivity, and it is not clear to 
what extent, if any, this might affect the results. 
The study identified some interesting potential 
applications, some of which would exploit the 
strengths of the two models: 
Firstly, there is potential for using the two 
models together in an analysis which will use 
the AcciMap to identify (potentially) multiple 
strands of causal factors, then using the Reason 
approach to identify defences within the key 
nodes which can be improved. 
Secondly, the models could be re-applied to 
individual nodes in the AcciMap, to acquire a 
higher-resolution view of that aspect of system 
performance. 
Thirdly, the use of the two models, together, as 
a pro-active safety tool is proposed. Such a tool 
could be applied to recorded “maintenance 
breakdowns” in a safety-critical organisation. In 
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effect, these recorded breakdowns can be 
viewed as incomplete accidents, allowing an 
organisation to self-assess its effectiveness and 
safety levels, and put in place improved safety 
methods. 
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